--- a/src/Predicates.v	Mon Oct 22 13:48:45 2012 -0400
+++ b/src/Predicates.v	Mon Oct 22 14:23:52 2012 -0400
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
 
 Recall that [unit] is the type with only one value, and [True] is the proposition that always holds.  Despite this superficial difference between the two concepts, in both cases we can use the same inductive definition mechanism.  The connection goes further than this.  We see that we arrive at the definition of [True] by replacing [unit] by [True], [tt] by [I], and [Set] by [Prop].  The first two of these differences are superficial changes of names, while the third difference is the crucial one for separating programs from proofs.  A term [T] of type [Set] is a type of programs, and a term of type [T] is a program.  A term [T] of type [Prop] is a logical proposition, and its proofs are of type [T].  Chapter 12 goes into more detail about the theoretical differences between [Prop] and [Set].  For now, we will simply follow common intuitions about what a proof is.
 
-The type [unit] has one value, [tt].  The type [True] has one proof, [I].  Why distinguish between these two types?  Many people who have read about Curry-Howard in an abstract context and not put it to use in proof engineering answer that the two types in fact _should not_ be distinguished.  There is a certain aesthetic appeal to this point of view, but I want to argue that it is best to treat Curry-Howard very loosely in practical proving.  There are Coq-specific reasons for preferring the distinction, involving efficient compilation and avoidance of paradoxes in the presence of classical math, but I will argue that there is a more general principle that should lead us to avoid conflating programming and proving.
+The type [unit] has one value, [tt].  The type [True] has one proof, [I].  Why distinguish between these two types?  Many people who have read about Curry-Howard in an abstract context but who have not put it to use in proof engineering answer that the two types in fact _should not_ be distinguished.  There is a certain aesthetic appeal to this point of view, but I want to argue that it is best to treat Curry-Howard very loosely in practical proving.  There are Coq-specific reasons for preferring the distinction, involving efficient compilation and avoidance of paradoxes in the presence of classical math, but I will argue that there is a more general principle that should lead us to avoid conflating programming and proving.
 
 The essence of the argument is roughly this: to an engineer, not all functions of type [A -> B] are created equal, but all proofs of a proposition [P -> Q] are.  This idea is known as%\index{proof irrelevance}% _proof irrelevance_, and its formalizations in logics prevent us from distinguishing between alternate proofs of the same proposition.  Proof irrelevance is compatible with, but not derivable in, Gallina.  Apart from this theoretical concern, I will argue that it is most effective to do engineering with Coq by employing different techniques for programs versus proofs.  Most of this book is organized around that distinction, describing how to program, by applying standard functional programming techniques in the presence of dependent types; and how to prove, by writing custom Ltac decision procedures.